## Livelihood outcomes of participation in a payment for ecosystem services (PES) program in Mt Elgon forest, Kenya

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 Forest ecosystems provide a range of services including provisioning, support, regulating and cultural services (FAO&UNEP, 2020)

They are at risk of irreversible loss due to high degradation rates (FAO, 2018)

• High degradation levels risk livelihoods of forest communities and affect natural biodiversity.

Hence a need to balance between livelihood improvement and reduced forest degradation

## Background

 One such way is through incentive based conservation approaches such as payment for ecosystem services (PES)

PES provides payments to households to align land use practices with sustainable natural resource management

The arrangement allows for dual benefits: livelihood improvement ecosystem restoration

## **PES program in Kenya**

- Mt Elgon forest is one of Kenya's major water towers
- Plantation Establishment Livelihood Improvement Scheme (PELIS) has been implemented in the region since 2005.
- Households are allocated plots in degraded forest land for restoration with an allowance to cultivate crops until trees form a canopy.
- Crops cultivated entirely benefit the farm households as an incentive to tend the trees for restoration.

### **Research** objectives

- To evaluate the effect of PES on household food security levels among households in Mt Elgon forest region
- To assess the effect of PES on income among households in Mt Elgon forest region

## **Data and Methods**

- Participation is assessed as binary- Participants and non-participants in PELIS
- Food security- Measured using household Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) and household food consumption expenditure (FCExp)
- Income-computed from all sources of household income
- Propensity score matching used to estimate the average treatment effect
- Quantile regression used to assess distributional effects of participating in PES

#### Sampling and study area

Study area

919 households sampled

First stage- purposive sampling forest stations

Second stage - random sampling of 30 villages in select forest stations

Last stage- random sampling from household lists as provided by village heads



#### **Analytical models**

Propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983):

Average treatment effect is denoted as

 $ATT \equiv E\{Y_{1i} - Y_{0i} \mid Di = 1\}$ 

Where  $Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}$  implies the effect of participation on PES on food security (a) or Income (b)

Quantile regression model:

$$\mathbf{X} = \beta_{\tau} X_i + \varepsilon_{\tau i}, Q_{\tau} \left( Y_i | X_i \right) = \beta_{\tau} X_i, \tau \in (0, 1)$$

Where  $Q_{\tau}(Y_i|X_i)$  represents quantile  $\tau$  of outcome Y i.e. total household income, dependent on X i.e. explanatory variables.

Quantiles  $\tau$  range between values 0 and 1.  $\beta$  represents the coefficients of the covariates quantiles estimated.

## Food security: FIES

Food security	Participants	Non-participants	Total	P-value
levels	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	
Food Secure	120 (27.40)	94 (21.27)	214 (24.32)	0.005
Mild food	70 (15.98)	55 (12.44)	125 (14.2)	
insecure				
Moderately food	91 (20.78)	101 (22.85)	192 (21.82)	
insecure				
Severely food	157 (35.84)	192 (43.44)	349 (39.66)	
insecure				

Largest proportion (39.66%) of households were severely food insecure with most of them being nonparticipants.

24.32% of the households were food secure with participants being more compared to their non-participating counterparts.

#### **Food security : HDDS**

Number of	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
food groups	Freq	Freq	Freq	Freq	Freq	Freq	Freq	Freq	Freq	Freq
consumed	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Participants	0	0	0	14	68	174	107	46	26	3
				(3.20)	(15.53)	(39.73)	(24.73)	(10.5)	(5.94)	(0.68)
Non-	1	7	9	15	85	170	84	56	15	0
participants	(0.23 )	(1.58)	(2.04 )	(3.39)	(19.23)	(38.46)	(19)	(12.67)	(3.39)	
Total	1	7	9	29	153	344	191	102	41	3
	(0.11 )	(0.80)	(1.02 )	(3.30)	(17.39)	(39.09)	(21.70)	(11.59)	(4.66)	(0.34)

 The HDDS differed between participants and non-participants with non-participants consuming lesser food groups (1-9) compared to their participating counterparts (4-10)

#### Food security: FCExp

Food securit	y Participants	Non-participants	Total	P-value
levels	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	Freq (%)	
Very vulnerabl	e 241 (55.02)	263 (59.5)	504 (57.27)	0.19
(food insecure)				
High foo	d 23 (5.25)	15 (3.39)	38 (4.32)	
insecurity				
Medium foo	d 37 (8.45)	42 (9.50)	79 (8.98)	
insecurity				
Low foo	d 137 (31.28)	122 (27.60)	259 (29.43)	
insecurity				

- A large proportion of all surveyed households (57.27%) were found to be highly vulnerable with the majority being non-participants in the PES program.
- About 29.43% of the households were found have low food security with a most being participants in PES

# Treatment effects of PES on household income and food security

Livelihood indicators	n. treatment	n. control	ATT	Std. Err.	t			
Food security								
FIES score	436	397	-0.495	0.239	-2.069			
HDDS	436	397	0.118	0.092	1.290			
FCexp	436	397	29.981	57.352	0.523			
Income (using the 4 estimators)								
Nearest neighbour	436	164	32040.39	12654.781	2.532			
Radius	436	397	22810.318	11505.210	1.983			
Kernel	436	397	31356.621	11122.323	2.819			
Stratified	436	397	33751.332	10816.330	3.120			

ATT value reveals that participation in PES reduces a household's FIES score by 0.495 implying a positive and significant effect on food security.

- HDDS and FCExp do not show any difference between participants and non-participants
- All PSM estimators show a positive effect of PES on household income

#### Quantile regression results on PES effects across income groups

Variables	Qt-1	Qt-2	Qt-3	Qt-4	Qt-5	Qt-6	Qt-7	Qt-8	Qt-9
DELIS	2842.267	6269.475	8306.245	11621.94	12919.07	12748.38	14318.63	15575.29	37510.3
FELIS	(1179.4)**	(1294.28)***	(1468.13)***	(2078.59)***	(2383.42)***	(2826.51)***	(4108.14)***	(6974.23)**	(12511.07)***
Acro	-65.887	-119.057	-174.731	-150.136	-183.264	-183.696	-244.478	-124.101	190.292
Age	(31.71)**	(39.217)***	(58.15)***	(76.42)**	(100.28)*	(100.395)*	(156.09)	(214.501)	(298.057)
Household size	-356.907	-574.991	-975.58	-949.649	-1291.65	-1064.521	-1360.614	-2115.418	-2780.936
nousenoia size	(207.26)*	(311.29)*	(378.02)***	(463.38)**	(500.01)***	(714.96)	(717.80)*	(1220.71)*	(1930.12)
Education level:	302.108	2810.93	2528.71	3947.074	2879.149	1624.162	3524.42	13370.76	16354.89
Secondary	(1029.28)	(1478.49)*	(1887.23)	(2634.254)	(3182.54)	(4292.66)	(6450.61)	(6893.53)*	(14925.63)
Tertion	1503.47	2338.333	825.979	298.207	-1019.119	11648.22	14681.16	1799.736	-11888.22
Ternory	(4665.39)	(6678.54)	(6094.39)	(8169.70)	(14710.5)	(16900.86)	(19761.19)	(22949.48)	(38861.87)
Wealth categories:	-429.822	-8530.821	-8193.226	-12545.96	-17607.32	-15167.27	-34032.07	-36500.26	-25924.25
Middle wealth	(2346.19)	(4823.15)*	(5783.796)	(7449.21)*	(7624.64)**	(11436.27)	(1473.17)**	(16877.39)**	(39357.44)
Poorest	-1517.03	-11651.73	-9798.858	-14649.7	-16946.82	-14856.62	-31665.69	-36264.87	-22872.36
Toolesi	(2607.72)	(5155.22)**	(6330.01)	(8361.15)*	(8317.01)**	(11597.59)	(15189.5)**	(16441.95)**	(41911.15)
Own land size	-21.598	281.910	489.795	520.364	376.805	490.931	-431.12	-457.241	36.922
Own fund size	(247.04)	(450.112)	(470.07)	(548.688)	(672.62)	(860.62)	(1156.86)	(1696.65)	(2684.71)
No of livestock	22/1.184	494.481	792.678	892.727	1423.646	1911.223	2261.74	2766.735	2779.826
IN OF INVESTOCK	(94.01)**	(157.06)***	(199.532)***	(170.84)***	(303.045)***	(290.89)***	(386.85)***	(440.96)***	(673.27)***
Off-form income	0.997	1.007	1.018	1.009	1.002	1.012	1.035	1.056	1.051
On-Idini income	(0.008)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***	(0.016)***	(0.018)***	(0.029)***	(0.039)***	(0.045)***	(0.055)***
	0.021	0.065	0.219	0.245	0.285	0.322	0.465	0.456	1.197
Asservalue	(0.046)	(0.097)	(0.087)**	(0.07)***	(0.088)***	(0.114)***	(0.195)**	(0.416)	(0.676)*
Yearly expenditure	0.019	0.029	0.023	0.025	0.035	0.046	0.054	0.070	0.1584
really experiance	(0.009)**	(0.013)**	(0.014)	(0.02)	(0.020)*	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.103)
Extension	1093.59	1263.514	1984.606	3785.175	6503.578**	7625.29	11690.38	17803.87	8576.08
Extension	(843.17)	(1384.38)	(1914.01)	(2248.31)*	(2993.13)	(3965.07)*	(5234.04)**	(7537.31)**	(14137.17)
Shocks value	0.025	0.025	0.056	0.067	0.059	0.077	0.139	0.221	0.238
	(0.013)*	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.04)*	(0.038)	(0.064)	(0.084)*	(0.117)*	(0.212)
Distance to road	33.315	-9.141	-123.143	-220.164	-321.345	-437.605	-403.903	-552.892	-641.641
	(43.49)	(72.34)	(109.18)	(138.77)	(152.815)**	(192.34)**	(239.56)*	(319.14)*	(494.16)
Forest extraction	1674.316	2013.697	730.879	981.882	606.289	1566.01	1454.442	-1668.804	8477.399
	(872.82)*	(1319.38)	(1585.03)	(1977.53)	(2066.17)	(2810.54)	(4544.11)	(7846.89)	(12126.78)
Constant	1949.567	11821.68	15457.8	21425.77	30898.73	30602.99	60373.81	61322.93	26151.43
Considin	(3139.27)	(5751.84)**	(7340.581)**	(8822.88)**	(10270.85)***	(15962.74)*	(21229.5)***	(26053.03)**	(48175.51)

Standard events in parentheses \*\*\* B<0.001 \*\*B<0.05 \*B<0.10

#### Key messages

- PELIS has a positive effect on food security especially the food sufficiency dimension
- The scheme can be lauded for equity It shows equal distributional impacts of income across all households.
- These findings imply attainment of double benefits, that is, ecosystem restoration and livelihood improvement.
- A major policy implication: involving forest dependent communities in forest management through incentive-based programs can be a pathway to increased income, improved food security, reduced poverty and enhanced equality among households.

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